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PRELIMINARY REMARKS
The following report is a summary and evaluation of three studies
that were performed for the Aircraft Energy Efficiency (ACEE) (..lice at
NASA headquarters on capital investment decision making in the civil
aviation industry. The studies were performed between July and November
of 1976 by three nationally known research firms, Arthur D. Little, Inc.,
Battelle Columbus Laboratories, and Gellman Research Associates. The
author of this report closely monitored the progress and evolution of
these studies from the beginning. This report is intended to provide a
concise explanation of the significant findings of the studies, both
individually and as a total package. Furthermore, it is hoped that the
observations and evaluation of the author will assist NASA personnel in
their own evaluations and in determining how to disseminate and act upon
the results of the studies.
The purpose of these studies was to provide ACEE with information
regarding how aircraft manufacturers and commercial airlines make invest-
ment decisions regarding the acquisition of new and derivative technology.
This information was requested to assist NASA in its efforts to promote
the development of energy efficient technology and to be responsive to
the needs and constraints of industry planners.
To put the findings of the three studies into proper perspective,
it is necessary to consider the environment in which they were performed.
First of all, the timing of the studies was significant. The studies
were completed a) within a relatively short turnaround time (four to
five months); b) during the summer months when the consultants them-
selves as well as their interview sources had scheduled vacations at
-1-
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various intervals; c) prior to a presidential election and in the face
of widespread uncertainty regarding regulatory questions and other
government policy issues; and, finally, d) during a period of economic
instability in which the financial fortunes of the civil aviation in-
dustry were subject to heated debate and often conflicting analyses by
recognized experts in the field. The latter two constraints presented
both a problem and an opportunity. while widespread uncertainty regarding
the future of the industry makes definitive conclusions impossible for
the most part, it is also during such turbulent times that careful
analysis is most important.
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j	 THE MARKET FOR AIRLINE AIRCRAFT
by
f	 Arthur D. Little, Inc., and Simat, Hellieser & Eichner, Inc.
The ADL study is a careful look at the future reequipment needs of
U.S. airlines and the forces that will affect demand for new aircraft
over the next decade. The study relies heavily on a proprietary fore-
casting model of airline equipment requirements and capital availability.
The model, which belongs to ADL's subcontractor, Simat, Hellieser and
r
Eichner, Inc. (SH&E), provides forecasts for each of the U.S. Trunks and
Pan American Airlines of earnings, equipment purchases, capital needs and
^i
sources, and breakdowns of total invested capital between internal and
external financing out to 1984.
The purpose of the study is "to examine the anatomy of equipment
forecasts" and the divergent assumptions used in making them. In this
'r	 way ADL attempts to "flag" those variables to which forecasts are most
sensitive and to describe the factors which may ultimately have the
t.
greatest impact on the future demand for aircraft.
I^	 The SH&E forecasting model projects total purchases of 744 passenger
Gaircraft by 1984 at a cost of $18.5 billion. This results in total capital
f^	 requirements of $29.6 billion, of which the airlines will be capable of
r ^financing internally only $18.3 billion. By comparison, other independent
forecasts of airline capital requirements out to 1985 have predicted
E	 capital needs ranging between $21 billion and $47 billion.
Paced with this tremendous disparity in forecasting ( a total of
$26 billion, "over twice the total capital investment committed to
i
Ef	 launch the U.S. airline industry into the jet age"), the study points
I^
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out that the majority of this difference can be explained by the sensi-
tivity of the forecasts to assumptions regarding the service life of
civil aircraft. Table 1 on the following page gives a comparison of
four independent forecasts of airline capital requirements and the
assumptions made in arriving at the final amount forecast.
According to the ADL study, the most significant difference among
these forecasts is the estimated service life of the aircraft. The
following sensitivity test illustrates the dramatic impact of the ser-
vice life assumption, holding all other assumptions constant:
Service Life Assumption 16 yrs	 17 yrs.	 18 yrs.	 19 yrs.	 20 yrs.
Aircraft Retired by
1984	 1225
	
1138	 793	 712	 341
The uncertainty surrounding the service life assumption is important and
may easily contribute to the industry's risk perceptions regarding future
investments. while the different assumptions tend to "wash out" as the
forecasting horizon is extended outward, a difference of only a few years
can be very unsettling to those responsible for short-run investment
planning.
The ADL study concludes that the mayor driving force behind actual
aircraft retirements and replacement in the future will be government
noise regulations. In the absence of truly major technological improve-
ments in commercial aircraft, the other two determinants of economic
service life, competition and productivity, will not bring about the
retirement of significant numbers of older aircraft before environmental
regulation has made them obsolete. Of the 1,758 aircraft owned by the
Domestic Trunks and Pan Am as of December 31, 1975, over 1,200 did not
meet PAR Part 36 requirements. The timetable that is ultimately chosen
,:
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TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF RECENT AIRCRAFT
INVESTMENT FORECASTS
Group Forecast
Years Forecast 1976
through
Aircraft Service Life3
(Narrow Body)
Inflation Rate
Seating Density
Traffic Growth
Load Factor
Add or for Spares and
Ground Equipment
Capital Expenditures
($Bil.) Forecast
ATA DL&J Boeing SH&E
U.S. Trunk Trunk Trunk
Airlines & PA & PA & PA
1985 1985 1985 1984
18 181 16 171
60 5s 6% 5.55
CAB CAR CAB CAB
5; 6% 6% 7.30
60 0 62;2 58% 60%
20% 20% 20% 25%
$26 $21 $47 $23
1Retirements based on individual airline analysis of needs
and financing capability, whereas other forecasts are based
on retirement at given elapsed year regardless of individual
airline situation.
2 62% domestic, 57% international.
3Wide body aircraft will not be retired over forecast period
except for occasicnal fleet simplification actions.
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for compliance with FAR 36 regulations, therefore, will bear heavily on
the timing of future demand for new aircraft.
In the two concluding chapters of the ADL study, the implications of
possible changes in the structure of the airline and aerospace industries
are discussed. Although no predictions are made, a brief summary of the
most plausible outcomes of various possible changes is provided. After
describing some of the major issues in the regulatory reform question,
the ADL study concludes that future changes in the structure and perfor-
mance of the airline and aerospace industries are "matters of speculation
and conjecture" at this point in time.
The final. section of the study is devoted to a discussion of the
major issues that can significantly affect the future demand for U.S.
commercial aircraft. These issues are 1) the emergence of multinational
manufacturing consortia, 2) the structure of the U.S. aircraft / engine
manufacturing industry, 3) airline deregulation, and 4) foreign com-
petition.
The principal value of the ADL study is its description and analysis
of the variables which are likely to have the greatest impact on the
future demand for U.S. aircraft. The actual forecast of this demand over
a specified time horizon is an impossible undertaking in view of the
tremendous regulatory and economic uncertainties that currently confront
the industry. There is thus widespread disagreement regarding the
future structure and performance of the airlines and their equipment
manufacturers. The ADL study explains the basis for this disagreement
and points out some of the key forces that may ultimately determine the
fate of the U.S. civil aviation industry. Foremost among these forces
are government regulation and the financial performance of U.S. airlines.
C
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FACTORS AFFECTING THE CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS OF AIR TRANSPORT MANUFACTURERS
by
Battelle, Columbus Laboratories
The Battelle study is a detailed analysis of the design and develop-
ment process used by the jet engine and airframe manufacturers in bring-
ing new aviation technology into commercial production. The raw data for
the study were obtained in personal interviews with industry personnel, a
literature survey, and by means of extensive analysis on the part of
Battelle's in-house consultants. The study attempts to define both the 	 j
key "decision influencers" and the principal barriers to innovation that
affect the decision to progress from one stage to the next in the techno-
logical development process. It is a study of the timing of technological
innovation and of the factors that influence the pace at which nen
technology can be integrated into commercial production.
Battelle's study methodology relies heavily on a matrix analysis of
the "generic components" of the decision-making process in the commercial
airframe and jet engine industry. The generic components in the decision-
making process identified by Battelle are:
• design and development stages
• decision criteria
• decision influencers
• barriers to innovation.
L
	
	
Each generic component was subdivided into its various elements so that
the interaction of these components could be studied in detail. Although
the elements were very similar for both jet engine and airframe manufac-
turers, a few of the elements were necessarily different due to differences
t !	
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in technical and organizational structure in the respective industry
segments. Subsequent to interviews with members of the industry, the
Battelle interviewers spent considerable time filling in detailed
matrices, simplified versions of which are shown on the following page.
In these matrices, Battelle attempted to match:
a) the design criteria considered in the development of a new
technology with the design and development stages during
which the criteria were found to be relevant;
b) the decision influencers that have an impact on the
decision process with the design criteria, and
c) the barriers to innovation with the decision influencers.
Whenever the interrelationship between two elements was considered
important, a value of "1" was placed in the proper square; otherwise "0"
was recorded. In this way the interviewers attempted to convey a composite
picture of the attitudes of the three major airframe manufacturers on the
one hand (Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed), and the two jet engine
manufacturers on the other (Pratt and Whitney Aircraft and General Electric).
After the initial three matrices were completed, the relative
importance of the individual barriers and the decision influencers was
determined (by means of simple matrix multiplication) for each stage in
the design and development process and for the process overall. The
resultantlists of decision elements, ranked according to their perceived
importance, are described in detail in the Battelle report and are not
duplicated here.
Interpretation of these rankings, however, should be done with great
care not to overestimate the precision of the analysis. Due to the sub-
jective nature of the investigation, the data have passed through a
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I,i	 series of " filters," each of which tends to magnify the subjective
character of the study. The raw data were obtained principally through
u
^I	 private interviews with industry personnel. The first "filter," then,
l is created by the personal impressions and interpretations of these people.
Secondly, the Battelle staff needed to interpret the answers obtained to
determine the degree of importance to be ascribed to each answer. For
example, in analyzing any particular barrier to innovation, the inter-
viewer had to determine the degree to which the barrier was considered
important by the interviewee and the degree of certainty to be placed on
this interpretation. In other words, the interview data were passed
through a second filter, the perceptions of the interviewer.
Finally, the raw data had to be condensed and organized in a meaning-
ful fashion. Itwas at this stage that the greatest amount of subjectivity
occurred. The interviewers spent many hours filling in the complicated
matrices described previously and deciding whether particular barriers
were "important" relative to various decision influencers, at various
stages in the development process, and according to a variety of decision
criteria. To avoid greater complexity in the analysis, no attempt was
made to weight these interpretations, but rather a simple binary scale
was used whereby two elements were considered to be either "matched" or
"not matched." For example, the barrier called "lack of trained main-
tenance personnel" was considered either to be important to, say, the
board of directors, or it was not considered important. The degree of
importance was ignored and there were no obvious guidelines for deciding
at what point the barriers became significant. Obviously, at some point
it can be argued that all barriers are important to all decision in-
fluencers, and that all decision influencers are important to the decision
process.
,i
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It is very likely that different rankings would have been obtained
had a weighted scale been employed. Even then, however, the subjectivity
of the findings would be very great indeed.
The study employs an innovative research technique to analyze a very
difficult and complicated process; its results reflect the best judgment
of a competent group of consultants. The nature of the study methodology,
however, makes these results highly sensitive to errors in perception and
interpretation on the part of the interviewing staff.
As a result, the fact that one barrier or decision influencer is
ranked ahead of another is not very significant; indeed, it may be very
misleading. On the other hand, highly ranked barriers taken as a group
are probably a good indication of some of the elements to which the
decision to incorporate new technology is perceived to be highly sensitive.
In addition to the above analysis, the Battelle study also provides
a brief history and analvsis of recent developments in the engine and
airframe manufacturing industry. Special recognition is given to the
timing of the design and development process employed prior to the final
commitment to commercial production. The selection of the design and
development stages mentioned previously was directed by this analysis.
An appendix is also provided in which special issues relevant to advanced
composite structures are discussed along with recommendations concerning the
timing and direction of composite design and development efforts. Specific
suggestions include the education and retraining of technical personnel,
improvements in design and testing techniques, and the pursuit of oppor-
tunities to reduce the overall cost of the design and development process.
The value of the Battelle studv to NASA comes not in the apparent
precision of the study, but in the exercise of identifying the barriers
`J
^|	 '
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that exist to technological l000vaLioo. Their analysis serves to remind
	
|	 us of the risk perceptions of the industry decision mabera. In almost
<(
	
'	 every case, the most important barriers to innovation reflect the
uncertainty surrounding the cost of new technology and/or the risk-averse
nature of the industry decision makers.
|^/
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aANALYSIS OF FLIGHT EQUIPMENT PURCHASING PRACTICES OF
REPRESENTATIVE AIR CARRIERS
by
Gellman Research Associates
The Gellman study is an analysis of investment decision making in
the commercial air transportation industry. It attempts to describe the
detailed process used by air carriers to decide whether or not to purchase
flight equipment. In view of the many technological and organizational
changes that have occurred in the industry, documenting this decision
process is clearly both an important and formidable task.
The dynamics of this industry are such that few commercial airlines
have developed formal investment decision-making systems. Nonetheless,
all of these companies maintain a variety of purchasing policies and
practices, many of which can be schematically described and categorized.
By means of extensive personal interviews with airline executives
and staff, the Gellman team first identified a "conceptual decision pro-
cess" employed by all airlines. This process has two stages. The first
stage is really an ongoing system whereby each carrier keeps abreast of
significant developments in its environment and endeavors to plan ac-
cordingly. Specifically, the first stage involves three steps:
1. Identify she environment (competition, economic
conditions, technology, etc.);
2. Determine the corporate direction (strategic plan-
ning and goal-setting); and
3. Identify policy options (acquire new aircraft,
modify current aircraft, dispose of surplus aircraft).
The second stage, then, is the technical and financial evaluation
of alternatives leading up to a final decision. This stage proceeds
It
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through four additional steps:
4. Evaluation of options (engineering, operations,
marketing and finance);
5. Selection of best options;
6. Pine-tune best options; and
7. Approval.
Ten airlines were ultimately selected for the study, these being
representative of different cross-sections of the industry. The decision-
making process employed by them was analyzed and decision process flow
charts for each were included in the Gellman report. The Gellman team
determined that these decision processes could be grouped into three
categories, and decision models unique to each group were constructed.
The general characteristics that distinguished the three groups were as
follows:
Group I
The two domestic trunk carriers in this group, although
dissimilar in terms of size, have in common consistent profit-
ability and each has a structured fleet planning process.
These airlines are expected to sponsor new aircraft in the
future ana each has extensive engineering capability. Return
.j	 on investment (ROI) is the determinant factor for their equip-
`1
I
	ment purchases.
Group II
This category is comprised of three major trunk carriers
and an international carrier. They are similar in that they
have experienced financial difficulty recently and have no
structured fleet planning process. Investment decisions by
this group of airlines are financially constrained, and thus
i^
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these airlines cannot be expected to sponsor a new aircraft
during the near future. Like the Group I carriers, however,
these companies also have extensive engineering capability
and, with the exception of one airline, ROI is the deter-
1	
minant factor in equipment decisions.
Group III
The carriers in Group III include a scheduled all-cargo
carrier and three supplemental carriers. They are similar
in that they maintain a small fleet size and operate in a
generally less sophisticated fashion than either of the other
two categories of carriers. The managerial character of
Group III carriers is "entrepreneurial" rather than systems-
oriented. These carriers generally require unique equipment
characteristics and trading aircraft is a major source of
profit for them.
Having described the decision processes of the three groups of car-
riers, the Gellman study goes on to point out a number of barriers and
4
catalysts to the commercial implementation of new technology, as per-
ceived from the analysis of these groups. Among the more significant
1
barriers mentioned is the financial weakness of the Group II carriers.
The presumed implication of this barrier is that technological con-
siderations may be subordinated to short-run financial demands, thus
ti
retarding the pace of the commercial integration of available new tech-
nology. On the other hand, while new equipment purchase decisions will
require more extensive economic justification in the future, new cost-
reducing technologies will be well received once confidence in the
technology has been established.
11^y•
dd
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Another major barrier (or is it a catalyst?) is the position of the
Group I carriers as the expected future sponsors of new aircraft. This
implies a possible reduction in the number of alternative aircraft designs
due to a greater emphasis on meeting the specific needs of these carriers,
to the possible detriment of competing airlines.
By combining the decision process flow models for the three groups
of carriers, the Gellman study finally derives the "universal" decision
model. A reproduction of the flow chart depicting this universal decision-
making process is shown on page 17.
The value of the Gellman study to NASA, in addition to identifying
the foregoing decision-making calculus, is its analysis of the principal
barriers to investments in new technology by the major air carriers.
Paramount among these barriers is the financial condition of the air
carrier industry. It is indicated that weaker carriers will be unable to
make optimum and independent technologv investments, since their invest-
ment policies will be dictated largely by financial considerations.
Another interesting conclusion of the study is chat the "air carriers
generally feel that aircraft producers do not understand sufficiently the
process underlying the flight equipment investment decision." This
results in misallocations of marketing resources, which may further delay
the process of integrating new technology into commercial production.
The Gellman report lists a number of recommendations, most of which
center around the need for good communications between industry and NASA.
By learning more about the financial and engineering inputs to the air-
line investment decision-making process, as well as by integrating the
industry decision makers into NASA's own R&T planning process, Gellman
suggests that the speedy transfer of new technology can be facilitated.
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DECISION FILL CHART
( continued )
Competitive Fleet Analysis
High Time of Existing FleetO	 Existing Load Factors
Market Forecasts
Economic Forecasts
Manufacturers Data
Size of Order
Special Operational RequirementsO	 Ground Operational Requirements
Convertability
Delivery Timing
Unit Costs
Seat Mile Costs
O	 Plane Mile Costs
3	 Ton Mile Costs
Trade-in
Expected Break-even Load Factor
Used vs New
Airport Compatability
Performance Specifications
Plane Mile Costs
Seat Mile Costs
Commonality
Service Record
First OperatorO	 U.S. Manufacture
Ability to Request Design Changes
Flight Operations Characteristics
Service Life
Design Concept
Number of Engines
After Sale Support
Parts Pool
Passenger Appeal
Wide BodyO	 Service FeaturesFirst Operator
Number of Engines
Unit Cost
Irterest Rate
O trade-inProfit
Investment Tax Credit
Depreciation Policy
Leasing Terms
.	 '1
ti	 The decision diagrams developed in the Gellman study are interesting
li	 and warrant further analysis. Additional elaboration of the engineering
components of the process could be enlightening, especially since the
engineering input proved to be of greater importance to the overall in-
vestment decision-making process than was initially expected by the
	 }
Gellman team.
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GENERAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDIES
The results of the three studies include a number of specific obser-
vations and detailed commentaries, but the underlying theme in each of
them can be summarized in a single word:
	 uncertainty.
The ADL study demonstrated the extreme difficulty in forecasting the 1
?l
future demand for aircraft in light of the uncertain economic and
regulatory environment facing the airline industry today.
t
The Battelle study highlighted the barriers to technological innova-
a
4
tion and the sensitivity of the industry decision makers to specific
elements of technological and economic uncertainty.
Finally, the Gellman study revealed the airlines' reluctance to
commit themselves to expensive capital investments in new technology in
the face of uncertain economic benefits and limited capital availability.
While all of this comes as little surprise to anyone familiar with
the industr ,v's recent history, sometimes the full significance of obvious r
-
conditions is easily overlooked.
	 Recognition of the specific uncertain- j
ties brought out in the studies may lead not on ly to
	 	 	 greater understanding,
but potentially to actions designed to alleviate uncertainty and thereby
hasten the pace of technological advance.
j
Timing is of critical importance to the ACEE technology program.
	 It
is clear that no new aircraft will be built as a result of the availa-
'i
— _
^s
bility of energy efficient technology alone; rather energy efficient
technology will be incorporated into commercial production only when
forces that lie beyond NASA's influence have created a need for new
i
equipment.
	 The critical question thus becomes whether or not the ACEE
technologies will be ready for commercial introduction at that time.
	 The
three studies recently concluded have pointed out some of the most impor-
-20-
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tant criteria by v•hich the "readiness" of this technology will be judged
by investors when that decision is made. The one common property of these
criteria is the investor's perception of economic risk.
Economic Risk
According to Mr. Irwin Kabus, senior operations research officer at
the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, economic risk can be
defined as follows:
"Essentially, risk is a consequence of the fact that investment
alternatives are governed by environmental factors beyond our
control—that is, they are surrounded by uncertainty. As a
result of this uncertainty, no one particular return can be
associated with an investment alternative; rather, what is asso-
ciated is a range of possible returns along with their correspond-
ing chances of occurrence. If the range of possible returns,
corresponding to a particular investment alternative, is wide,
with the returns at the extremes having significant chances of
occurring, then that investment alternative is called risky.
Conversely, the narrower the range of possible outcomes, the
less risky is the alternative."l
Risk, therefore, is the perceived variability of the potential economic
return from investment alternatives. The greater the uncertainty regarding
the outcome of a given investment, the wider the perceived variability of
return and the greater the investor's perception of risk will be. It
naturally follows from this statement that risk perceptions can be reduced
to the extent that investor uncertainty is eliminated.
Unfortunately, there are no precise instruments with which risk
can be measured. It is entirely a function of the perceptions of a given
investor regarding some set of future events, and even the investor him-
self is hard pressed to quantify his own risk perceptions in any meaning-
ful fashion.
1. Inoin Kabus, "You Can Bank on Uncertainty," Harvard Business Review
May/June, 1976, p. 95.
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obviously risk cannot be analyzed in a vacuum: it is only meaningful
when compared to some level of anticipated economic return. As everyone
knows, investors can usually be persuaded to assume relatively higher
levels of perceived risk (variability of return) provided the expected
return is sufficiently attractive. Furthermore, investors can be
categorized according to the degree to which they are risk-averse. That
is, highly risk-averse investors will require higher expected returns
than less risk-averse investors facing comparable levels of perceived
economic uncertainty.
The ADL and Gellman reports indicate that the U.S. airlines can be
expected to show a higher aversion to economic risk over the foreseeable
future than has been typical in recent years. By implication, therefore,
their required return for incurring additional perceived risk will increase,
i.e., they will demand the promise of greater benefits from an increment
of risk-bearing technology than ever before. Since there are obvious limits
to the potential near-term benefits of new technology, the goal of lowering
investor perceptions of risk becomes critical to the incorporation of new
technology on commercial aircraft.
Reducing Economic Risk
A variety of possible approaches to reducing investor uncertainly
(both manufacturer and airline) are suggested either explicitly or implicitly
in the three studies. Many of these fall into areas that NASA is already
actively pursuing, while others imr'y possible adjustments in orientation
or expansion of existing efforts. There exist at least three categories
of action that could result in reduced perceptions of uncertainty about
Ji
-23-
the benefits and costs of new technology.
The first category is information dissemination and exchange among
government regulatory bodies, industry and NASA. One of the major
concerns of the manufacturers is the time and cost of certifying new
technology with the PAA. It is suggested by the Battelle study that the
risk of certification delays is reduced by the frequent communications that
take place between the regulatory bodies, industry and NASA concerning the
status of developing technologies. The Gellman study points toward
possible benefits from increased communications with the airline industry.
Other specific recommendations might be offered as well, but the central
point is clear: to the extent that all available information regarding
the progress of new technology development is disseminated thoroughly
among the relevant "decision influencers," perceptions of uncertainty and
economic risk can be reduced.
A second category is NASA's financial and technical collaboration
with industry in the early phases of new technology development. This,
of course, is the principal activity of the AGEE technology program. The
impact of this kind of activity is to limit much of the economic risk of
long—range development and to broaden the information and experience base
necessary to bring the technology into commercial production. Additional
efforts in the design of new tools and techniques for use in such areas as
nondestructive testing and materials fabrication are suggested by Battelle
as possible amplifications of current activities.
The third general category of activity that can result in decreased
perceptions of risk is the continued reevaluation on the part of NASA's
technical managers of the needs and economic constraints of private industry.
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jAs the economic and regulatory haze lifts over the industry during the
near future, the structure and fortunes of the industry will become
clearer, perhaps signalling the need for new kinds of technology and
shifts in development activities. The ADL study points out some of the
major variables that can create dramatic changes in civil aviation over
the next decade and the need to closely monitor these forces. Fore-
casting new opportunities for technological integration is highly
den ,^ndent upon an awareness and sensitivity toward these changes.
In summary, the findings of the three studies recently completed
remind us of the risk-averse nature of the airlines and aircraft
manufacturers and of the uncertainties t which they are most highly
sensitive at the current time. By helping to reduce these uncertainties,
NASA will be able to speed up the pace of technological innovation and
the incorporation of energy efficient technologies in commercial aircraft.
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